State Police: Can Nigeria Decentralise Security Without Politicising It?

 

By Steven Dan-Asabe Aya 

For decades, Nigeria has wrestled with a policing structure that puts virtually all civilian policing power in the hands of the Federal Government.

The arrangement was designed to provide a unified national police force in a country where security threats frequently cross state boundaries. But Nigeria has changed dramatically since the current policing architecture was established.

The population has grown. Cities have expanded. Criminal networks have become more sophisticated. Kidnapping, banditry, communal violence, terrorism, cultism, armed robbery and other forms of organised crime have created security challenges that are often intensely local in character.

Yet the police officer responding to a crime in a remote community may still be operating within a highly centralised system in which major decisions, resources and command structures are controlled from far beyond the community.

That contradiction has helped keep state police at the centre of Nigeria's national conversation.

Nigeria's Parliament has now taken a major step towards changing the country's policing architecture, passing a constitutional amendment bill that would allow states to establish their own police forces alongside the Nigeria Police Force. 

The Federal Government has also reaffirmed its commitment to police reform and described state police as imperative to addressing Nigeria's security challenges. 

But the more Nigeria moves towards decentralised policing, the more difficult the central question becomes:

Can the country bring policing closer to the people without bringing political control closer to the police?

Why the current system is under pressure;

Nigeria's security problems are not theoretical. Across different parts of the country, communities have experienced attacks by kidnappers, bandits, terrorists, cult groups and other criminal networks.

The scale and diversity of these threats have exposed the limitations of a single, centrally controlled police structure trying to respond to security problems spread across a country of more than 200 million people.

A police officer posted to Lagos may confront urban organised crime and cybercrime. An officer operating in north-western Nigeria may be dealing with armed bandit groups.

In the South-East, the challenge may include separatist violence and attacks on security personnel.

In the Niger Delta, police operations may involve oil theft, pipeline vandalism and organised criminal networks.

The threats are different.

The communities are different.

The terrain is different.

The local intelligence required is different.

Yet the fundamental policing structure remains largely the same.

This is one of the strongest arguments made by supporters of state police.

They argue that policing works best when officers understand the communities they serve, know the local languages and social networks, and can respond quickly to threats without waiting for decisions from a distant central authority.

The argument for bringing policing closer;

The strongest case for state police is not simply that governors should have more power.

It is that communities should have greater ownership of their security.

A police officer who knows the roads, villages, markets, traditional institutions and community leaders in a particular area may be better positioned to identify suspicious movements and gather useful intelligence than an officer transferred into the area from another part of the country.

Local policing can also improve response times.

When a crime occurs, minutes can determine whether suspects escape or are arrested.

A centralised system can create bureaucratic delays, particularly when police resources are overstretched.

Decentralisation could allow states to determine their own policing priorities and allocate resources according to local needs.

This is particularly important because Nigeria's security challenges are not evenly distributed.

A state facing a serious kidnapping crisis should not necessarily have exactly the same policing priorities as a state dealing primarily with urban crime.

Supporters therefore see state police as a way of making the security system more flexible.

But there is another side to the argument

The strongest argument against state police is not that decentralisation cannot improve policing.

It is that Nigeria's political environment could turn state police into an instrument of political control.

Governors already wield enormous influence within their states.

They control significant public resources and exercise considerable influence over political structures. Giving them direct or indirect control over armed security personnel therefore raises serious questions.

What happens when a governor's political opponent organises a protest?

What happens during an election?

What happens when a journalist investigates the state government?

What happens when a traditional ruler challenges government policy?

What happens when opposition politicians accuse the government of corruption?

The answer will depend entirely on the safeguards built into the new system.

This is why opponents of the current proposal have raised concerns about the possibility of state police being used for political purposes ahead of the 2027 general election.

The concern is not without precedent.

Nigeria's political history contains numerous examples of political actors attempting to use security institutions to intimidate opponents.

A poorly designed state police system could therefore create a new problem while attempting to solve an old one.

The governor cannot become the police commissioner. This is where the architecture of state policing becomes more important than the slogan.

If Nigeria establishes state police, the police must not become personal security organisations for governors.

A governor should not be able to decide who gets arrested.

A governor should not be able to order police officers to break up opposition meetings.

A governor should not be able to deploy police officers against political opponents.

And a police officer should not have to choose between obeying an unlawful political instruction and protecting his career. The system therefore requires strong institutional safeguards.

An independent state police commission would be one of the most important.

The commission must have enough independence to recruit, discipline and supervise officers without becoming an extension of the governor's office.

The police leadership must also have operational independence.

Political leaders can establish broad security priorities, but day-to-day policing decisions should remain professional and accountable.

Without that distinction, state police could become little more than federal policing with 36 different political masters.

There is also the question of money

Policing is expensive.

Vehicles must be purchased. Stations must be built. Officers must be trained and paid. Weapons, communications equipment, forensic facilities and information systems require constant investment.

A state police system could therefore expose another major inequality in Nigeria.

Lagos, Rivers, Delta, Ogun or other economically stronger states may have the financial capacity to maintain relatively sophisticated police forces.

What happens to poorer states?

Would they have enough money to pay competitive salaries?

Could they provide modern equipment?

Could they maintain vehicles and communications systems?

Could they train officers properly?

If the answer is no, Nigeria could end up with a two-tier security system in which wealthy states have functioning police forces while poorer states have poorly equipped formations. That could deepen rather than reduce insecurity.

The Federal Government would therefore still need to play an important role in establishing minimum national standards.

The danger of creating competing security powers;

There is another constitutional and operational question. Nigeria already has the Nigeria Police Force, the military, the Department of State Services, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps and various other security agencies.

Adding 36 state police forces could make coordination more complicated if responsibilities are not clearly defined.

Who takes charge when criminals cross state boundaries?

Who investigates interstate organised crime?

Who controls intelligence involving national security?

Who handles terrorism?

Who prosecutes officers accused of serious misconduct?

Who investigates abuses committed by state police?

These questions cannot be left for later.

The success of decentralised policing will depend heavily on whether the different institutions can cooperate rather than compete.

Nigeria is already paying for policing failures, there is also a financial argument for reform. Every kidnapping creates economic losses.

Every community forced to shut down because of insecurity loses economic activity.

Every farmer who abandons his land contributes to food insecurity.

Every business that closes because of insecurity means lost employment and reduced tax revenue.

Every family forced to pay ransom transfers resources from productive economic activity to criminal networks.

The cost of insecurity therefore extends far beyond police budgets. If better local policing can prevent even a fraction of these losses, the economic benefits could be substantial. 

But that will happen only if state police are genuinely professional. Technology must become part of the reform

Decentralising policing should not mean simply creating 36 new forces equipped with uniforms, vehicles and weapons.

Modern policing increasingly depends on information.

Criminal investigations require telecommunications intelligence, financial tracking, forensic analysis, databases, surveillance technology and evidence management.

Nigeria has already invested billions of naira in police intelligence and surveillance infrastructure.

An investigation by The ICIR found that approximately N19 billion was allocated between 2020 and 2025 for police intelligence equipment, communications monitoring and upgrades to strategic surveillance systems. Yet the investigation also found continued reports of complainants being asked to provide unofficial payments for tracking and investigation activities.

That contradiction offers an important lesson. Technology alone does not create effective policing. Money alone does not create effective policing.

What matters is whether resources are properly managed and whether officers are held accountable for how they use them.

State police must therefore be designed around professionalism, technology, intelligence and accountability, not merely proximity.

The Nigerian Police Force must also change. The debate about state police should not be interpreted as a declaration that the Nigeria Police Force has become irrelevant.

The opposite may be true.

A reformed federal police could become more effective if relieved of some local policing responsibilities. It could concentrate on crimes that cross state boundaries, terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime, national intelligence coordination and other areas requiring a national response.

State police could concentrate on community policing, local crime prevention, traffic enforcement and other responsibilities closer to the population.

The two systems could therefore complement each other. The challenge is designing the boundaries correctly.

What Nigeria must learn from other countries is that Decentralised policing is not an experiment that exists nowhere else.

Countries around the world operate policing systems in which local, regional and national authorities share responsibility.

But Nigeria cannot simply copy another country's model. Its political history, federal structure, ethnic diversity, institutional weaknesses and security environment are different

The lesson Nigeria should borrow is therefore not a particular organisational structure. It should borrow the principle that police power must always be accompanied by institutional accountability.

The closer the police are to political power, the stronger the safeguards must become.

The 2027 question;

The timing of Nigeria's state police debate makes the issue even more sensitive.The country is approaching another general election.

Elections in Nigeria have historically been accompanied by political violence, intimidation and accusations of security agencies being used selectively.

That is why some political actors have called for caution over the timing of implementation.

The concern should not be dismissed as partisan politics. Nor should it be used as an excuse to permanently postpone policing reform. The correct response is to build safeguards strong enough to survive political changes.

A good policing system should work under an APC government. It should work under a PDP government.

It should work under a Labour Party government. It should work when the governor belongs to the ruling party and when the governor faces a hostile legislature.That is the real test. 

The reform Nigeria needs

Nigeria does need a serious conversation about policing.

The country's security problems have become too complex for a one-size-fits-all approach. Local communities need police officers who understand them.

Police officers need better equipment and training.

Investigators need modern technology.

Victims need to be able to report crimes without being treated as sources of money.

And officers need protection from political interference when they act professionally.

But state police must not become an opportunity to distribute political power over armed men.

Nigeria must decentralise policing without decentralising impunity.

That distinction could determine whether the reform becomes one of the country's most important security breakthroughs or another institutional experiment that creates new problems.

The country is now closer than ever to changing its policing architecture.

The question is no longer simply whether Nigeria needs state police.

It is whether Nigeria is prepared to build state police strong enough to protect citizens, independent enough to resist political pressure and accountable enough to protect the democracy itself.That is the standard the reform must meet.

And anything less could leave Nigerians with 36 new police forces — but not necessarily safer communities.